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HARRY SHULMANt
THERE is a danger in discussing civil liability in connection with the
Securities Act that both the purpose of the Act and the emphasis of the
discussion will be misunderstood. It is not the object of the Act simply
to provide a legal remedy for the investor who has bought securities
upon a false representation, to compensate him for a loss incurred.
Even the provisions for civil liability are calculated to be largely pre-
ventive rather than redressive. Both in the extent of liability imposed
-the variety of persons to whom the liability is attached, the bases of
the liability, and the persons in whose favor it runs-and in the limita-
tion of the amounts recoverable, the in terrorem function of the Act is
evidenced. But even this purpose of securing preventive vigilance and
caution on the part of the persons concerned is only coordinate with,
or probably subordinate to, another object. The Act seeks not only to
secure accuracy in the information that is volunteered to investors, but
also, and perhaps more especially, to compel the disclosure of significant
matters which were heretofore rarely, if ever, disclosed. Civil liability
is imposed largely as one appropriate means of accomplishing these
ends, not as the end itself, or, on the other hand, as the only means.
While, then, discussion of the Act may properly be directed to the dif-
ferent provisions separately, it is apt to be misleading, and more covertly
disingenuous, if the principal objectives are not constantly pushed to the
front.
Apart from the Securities Act, the law does not condone misrepresen-
tation in the sale of securities. Ideally, if not actually, misrepresentation
entails possibilities of liability at common law intended to compensate
investors and deter false statement. But the common-law liability was
not consciously and especially moulded for the flotation of securities.
Instead, general tort and contract law, developed largely in connection
with other transactions, was applied piecemeal to securities cases as
they came before the courts. In this process, indulgence was, of course,
accorded to the mores of a developing business. The fortuitous incident
of choice of remedy by plaintiff's counsel was frequently given major
importance. A comprehensive underlying policy was rarely articulated.
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And the process of fitting specific cases into generalized rule and remedy,
developed largely for other situations, involved antithetical consequences.
On the one hand, it glossed over differentiating circumstance, special
feature or peculiar need, because of the fear of undue extension of lia-
bility generally. On the other hand, it succumbed to real differences
of fact which had little bearing, however, on the policy underlying
liability.
Deft pens have written the absorbing story of the protection accorded
to purchasers and consumers of goods.' Apart from the minimal require-
ments of weights and measures, pure food and similar legislation,' the
buyer's protection, both preventive and remedial, derives from judge-
made law. In addition, the buyer derives some extra-legal protection
as an incident of the competition for his dollars. Sales on approval or
with the privilege to return, made for the purpose of overcoming the
buyer's sales resistance or of gaining a talking point over competitors,
and the custom of many merchants to accept the return of defective
goods for the purpose of retaining the buyer's good will and trade, miti-
gate to some extent his risks in the market.'
The greatest adaptation in the shift of risks of purchase away from
the buyer has taken place in the law of warranty. Upon the mere sale,
the seller may now be held to a warranty to his buyer not only of his
title, but also of the merchantable quality of the goods, or of their fitness
for a particular purpose.4 With respect to defects causing physical in-
jury, some courts have endowed the warranty concept with capacity to
hurdle the forbidding notion of privity of contract in the endeavor to
throw the loss directly upon the manufacturer of the product or the
person dominant in the chain which brings the product to the consumer.
The result is accomplished by implying an understanding between the
parties to that effect-the familiar device of dressing coercive demands
of law imposed for reasons of policy in the garb of voluntary assumption
or mutual agreement. If legal taste and aesthetics were offended by the
extension of warranty beyond the two parties to the sale, substantially
similar results were achieved in the personal injury cases by purposeful
use of the concepts of fraud and negligence, aided by the "presumption,"
res ipsa loquitur.5 And while the limitations imposed upon the seller's
1. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1133; LmEWEI ,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES (1930) 209; RArNa, THE LAW=l PiusunTor GAIN (1931)
47.
2. See DuNN, FOOD AND DRUG LAWS (1927, Supp. 1929); Legis. (1931) 31 COL. L. rv.
872; Legis. (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 720. For a story of present agitation with respect to
proposed federal legislation, see Mitchell, Heap Bad Medicine (1933) 76 NEW REP. 353.
3. See Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods
(1930) 25 ILL. L. REv. 400, 415.
4. Ummomr SALES ACT §§ 13-16; 1 WILLISTON, SALES (1924) c. 9.
5. The story need not be developed here. When told, it is one of the best expositions
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exuberance in lauding his goods are few indeed, some bounds are indi-
cated. It is said that warranties need not be made in any particular
form, that any representations of fact by the seller inducing the sale may,
under the circumstances of particular cases, be deemed warranties, with
the consequent absolute liability upon the seller for losses caused as a
result of their falsehood.' In addition the buyer has several other
remedies: a defense to an action by the seller on the contract of sale,
rescission of the contract, or an action in tort for the damage caused by
the misrepresentation.
Theoretically, the same law protects the buyer of securities. But a
complex of factors, apart from the possibly different notions of policy
with respect to the substantive questions of liability, have made the
reality differ from the ideal. The seller of goods is engaged in the busi-
ness of selling them. His capacity to bear the loss or even to prevent
it is in many fields demonstrably greater than that of the buyer. The
ultimate purchaser, the consumer, buys for immediate consumption or,
in case of durable goods, for immediate use. With respect to a large
and growing number of commodities, each purchase is more or less in
direct response to the invitation and representations continuously adver-
tised by the manufacturer or trade-name owner. A hidden defect in
goods is generally quickly discovered when the goods are put to use.
The mask is then removed, the harm is caused, and the life of the
goods, as represented at least, is ended. The loss due to the original
defect in the goods is comparatively readily ascertainable and distinguish-
able from losses due to price fluctuation or other factors. The defective
commodity can be compared with the same commodity minus the defect
-a real thing. Quite different, however, is the case of securities. The
investor-seller is not engaged in the business of selling securities. A
stock or bond is not continuously advertised by issuer, underwriter or
distribution syndicate. While statements in prospectuses doubtless in-
fluence the market even after secondary distribution has ended, subse-
quent purchasers are, perhaps generally, not influenced consciously or
of the judicial process and the touted adaptability of the common law. See Bohlen,
Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees (1929) 45 L.
Q. REv. 343; Note (1933) 33 Cot. L. REv. 868; Note (1933) 18 CORN. L. Q. 445; Note
(1932) 7 WAsHr. L. REv. 351; Note (1932) 45 HlAv. L. REv. 1415; Note (1928) 42 HARv.
L. REV. 414.
6. Cf. Handler, False and Deceptive Advertising (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 22.
7. Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act provides that: "Any affirmation of fact or any
promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency
of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the
buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." For a general discussion of the development
of the doctrine which this section codifies, see Williston, Representation and Warranty in
Sales-Heilbut v. Buckleton (1913) 27 HARv. L. Rtv. 1; Bogert, Express Warranties in
Sales of Goods (1923) 33 YM L. J. 14.
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directly by such statements." The security may pass from investor to
investor with complete safety and cause a loss to a purchaser who was
never aware of the representation which proved false or of the signifi-
cant matter which was concealed. The original "defect" is seldom
easily discoverable and more seldom quickly discoverable. Each issue
of securities is unique. There is no "same security minus the defect"
with which to make comparison. The fall in the value of the security, the
loss to the investor, may be caused by innumerable factors of which the
facts misrepresented or concealed at the time of the original issuance
may truly be one. But whether or not they are a factor is frequently
conjectural, and the exact amount of their influence on the fall, almost
always conjectural. The original "defect" may never be discovered,
therefore, because the fall in value may be attributed to a complex of
other factors. And even when discovered, there remains the difficulty
of connecting it with the loss. Given, then, even the same remedies
available to purchasers of goods, the investor's burden of proof is not
a happy one.
The law of warranty has had little application in the sale of securi-
ties. Only a warranty of title and that the stock or bond is a general
security of the kind which it purports to be on its face is imposed on
the seller by implication from the mere sale. No warranty is implied
as to the quality or value or that the security was not issued in contra-
vention of constitution, law or corporate charter.' The buyer is held
to have, and exercise, his own judgment as to value; and he is charged
with knowledge of legal defects in the security. The liberality in treat-
ing representations in the sale of goods as warranties is absent in the
security cases. Affirmations, no matter how positively made, are not
warranties unless an intent to warrant is shown.' 0 There has not been
any tendency to extend the reach of warranty to remote seller or issuer.
And the doctrine seems not to differentiate between sales by individual
investors and sales by dealers or issuers.
8. Indirectly, however, very effective influence may be exerted. Other buyers may
know of the representation, rely upon it and thus create a larger demand for the security.
The statement may get into a financial manual or periodical. It may there be reported directly
or it may form the inarticulate foundation for an independent statement by the editors.
Or the representation may influence the judgment of investment counsel or advisers upon
whose opinions purchasers may rely.
9. See UNIFORM STOCK TRANsFER AcT § 11; Goodwyn v. Folds, 30 Ga. App. 204, 117
S. E. 335 (1923); Burwash v. Ballou, 230 Ill. 34, 82 N. E. 355 (1907).
10. Heilbut v. Buckleton, [1913] A. C. 30, discussed in Williston, supra note 7; Hender-
son v. Plymouth Oil Co., 13 F. (2d) 932 (W. D. Pa. 1926). The dearth of actions for
breach of warranty in sales of securities is significant. While many cases say that the
Uniform Sales Act is applicable to sales of securities [see Kaufman, Are Sales of Corporate
Stock Subject to the Uniform Sales Act? (1932) 10 N. Y. U. . Q. Rav. 157; (1932) 32 COL.
L. REv. 547; (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 918], it seems impossible to find a case so holding
with respect to Section 12.
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Some elements of the law of warranty are found, however, in the law
of rescission, when invoked by the buyer either defensively in the seller's
action for breach of contract or offensively in the buyer's action for re-
turn of the purchase price. In rescission, as in warranty, it is said that
the seller's wrong is sufficiently established when it is shown that he
made a false representation about a material fact. It does not matter
that the seller did not know of the falsity, that he did not intend to de-
ceive, that he honestly believed in the truth of his statement, that he had
very reasonable grounds for his belief.' Nor does it matter that the
falsity of the representation was not the cause of the fall in value. 2
The object of the rescission being to restore the status quo ante the sale,
it does not seem that a liability for loss is imposed upon the seller, or that
money is being taken from his pocket to compensate the buyer. His posi-
tion is not deemed to be unduly prejudiced if bets are declared off and
each party returns to the other what he received in the sale.
But rescission can be invoked only against the buyer's immediate seller.
It is available only to the person who buys from the misrepresentor.
The investor who buys a security in the market, either directly on the
strength of representations in a prospectus or circular or at a price in
which such representations were obviously factors, cannot invoke this
remedy either against his seller or the issuers of the prospectus or cir-
cular. 3 And in the sale of securities, unlike the sale of goods, this limi-
11. No more than an illustrative case need be cited. As doctrine, the point is trite.
That only lip service is paid to it in some cases is unquestionable. Occasionally, too, dis-
crimination is made between rescission in equity and rescission at law, with the doctrine
stated in the text confined to the former; and in some cases it is said that generally actual
fraud must be shown. See 3 WmLLISTox, CorTRAcrs (1920) § 1500; 2 WILrSTON, SALES
(1924) § 632. See also, Farnsworth v. The Muscatine Produce & Pdre Ice Co., 161 Iowa
170, 141 N. W. 940 (1913); Haebler v. Crawford, 258 N. Y. 130, 179 N. E. 319 (1932);
Hill v. International Products Co., 129 Misc. 25, 220 N. Y. Supp. 711 (Sup. Ct. 1925); and
cf. Henry v. Kopf, 104 Conn. 73, 131 Atl. 412 (1925); Moore v. Carrick, 26 Colo. App.
97, 140 Pac. 485 (1914); Whaley v. Niven, 175 Ark. 839, 1 S. W. (2d) 3 (1927). In-
many cases rescission was sought after the defendant corporation became insolvent and was
in the process of insolvency administration. The interest of creditors must have been
some influence in the choice of language as well as results. Cf. Stone v. Walker, 201 Ala.
130, 77 So. 554 (1917). Cf. note 15, infra.
12. See Seneca Wire & Manufacturing Co. v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N. Y. 1, 159
N. E. 700 (1928), where the false statement for which rescission was allowed was that
application had been made to list the security on the New York Stock Exchange. Re-
scission was sought when the buyer learned that his stock was worthless because the
corporation had gone into receivership. In a suit on the theory of rescission, it is
commonly said, plaintiff need allege only that he relied on the representation, not that he
suffered any loss thereby. Vulcan Fire Insurance Co. v. Jorgensen, 33 Cal. App. 763, 166
Pac. 835 (1917); Sheridan Oil Corp. v. Donaldson, 75 Colo. 584, 227 Pac. 553 (1924). But
language to the contrary is also available.
13. He cannot rescind against the issuer of the statement because there is no contract or
sale between them. Another remedy may, however, be available. Cf. Ritzwoller v. Lurie,
225 N. Y. 464, 122 N. E. 634 (1919). He cannot rescind against the seller, if, as we assume,
1933]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
tation excludes a large number of buyers. The corollary requirement
that rescission effect a restoration of the status quo provides additional
pitfalls: that the plaintiff did not or cannot return or tender to the seller
the subject-matter of the sale,14 that he did not act promptly and is guilty
of laches,15 that he did something which may be taken as a ratification of
the sale and as inconsistent with a desire to rescind. 6 And, again, be-
the seller did not make, adopt or use the statement. There are, as may be expected, limita-
tions even on this statement, but of not general importance in securities cases. See 2
W1MISTON, SALEs (1924) §§ 636a, 636b.
14. In cases involving innocent misrepresentations, it has sometimes been said that rescis-
sion of an executed contract of sale will not be enforced, apparently because complete restora-
tion of the status quo is not possible. The seller is deprived of the property and the op-
portunities to use or sell it while it was in the buyer's possession even if the identical prop-
erty is returned to him. See Sedden v. North Eastern Salt Co., [19051 1 Ch. Div. 326;
Angel v. Jay, [19111 1 K. B. 666. On the other hand, the plaintiff has been relieved of the
obligation to tender return of the property where it has become entirely worthless or where
complete return is impossible because of the defendant's conduct. Continental Jewelry Co.
v. Pugh Brothers, 168 Ala. 295, 53 So. 324 (1910); Zang v. Adams, 23 Colo. 408, 48 Pac.
509 (1897); 2 WILLISTON, SALEs (1924) § 610. "In exacting the return of benefits as a
condition of rescission it [a court of equity] proportions the exaction to the justice of the
case before it. . . . 'The wrongdoer will be left in the toils of his duplicity." Marr v.
Tumulty, 256 N. Y. 15, 21, 175 N. E. 356, 357 (1931). And it may be that a buyer of
securities who wishes to rescind after he has disposed of them may purchase like securities
on the market and tender them. But query. See Mayo v. Knowlton, 134 N. Y. 250, 31
N. E. 985 (1892); Francis v. New York & Brooklyn Elevated Rr. Co., 108 N. Y. 93, 15
N. E. 192 (1888); Note (1932) 4 (3) Coas. PiA.c. REv. 62. For illustrations of the
bother about restoration of status quo, see Edenborn v. Sim, 206 Fed. 275 (C. C. A. 2d,
1913); Jordan & Davis v. Annex Corp., 109 Va. 625, 64 S. E. 1050 (1909); Franey v.
Warner, 96 Wis. 222, 71 N. W. 81 (1897).
15. Since so many of the claims for rescission are made after the corporation has be-
come insolvent, the finding of laches is probably frequently influenced by a desire not
to give the complaining shareholder a preference over the remaining shareholders or an
interest prejudicial to the corporation's creditors [cf. Webb v. Tri-State Fair & Racing Asso-
ciation, 238 Ky. 87, 36 S. W. (2d) 839 (1931); Akers v. Radford State Bank, 153 Va.
1, 149 S. E. 528 (1929)] although it is said: "While the rule may be otherwise in England,
in this country it is generally held that a defrauded shareholder may rescind after the
insolvency of the corporation.' MacNamee v. Bankers' Union For Foreign Commerce &
Finance, 25 F. (2d) 614, 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). The point of laches is rarely presented
alone. Illustrative cases are Maginess v. Western Securties Corp., 38 Cal. App. 56, 175 Pac.
277 (1918); Marten v. Burns Wine Co., 99 Cal. 355, 33 Pac. 1107 (1893); Burwash v.
Ballou, supra note 9; Fletcher American Co. v. Culbertson, 215 Ky. 695, 286 S. W.
84 (1926); Sarantides v. Williams, Belmont & Co., 180 N. Y. Supp. 741 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
16. Retention of dividends, voting of the stock, attempts to sell the stock, payment of
purchase price instalments, attempts to settle the disputed claim, if occurring after the
buyer became aware of, or had reason to suspect, the falsity of the representations, may be
considered as ratifications of the sale which make rescission thereafter unavailable. See Mar-
ten v. Burns Wine Co., supra note 15; Stockmen's Guaranty Loan Co. v. Sanchez, 26 N. M.
499, 194 Pac. 603 (1921); Brennan v. National Equitable Investment Co., 247 N. Y. 486,
160 N. E. 924 (1928); Buker v. Leighton Lea Association, 63 App. Div. 507, 71 N. Y.
Supp. 610 (4th Dep't 1901); Davis v. Gifford, 182 App. Div. 99, 169 N. Y. Supp. 492
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cause of differences already mentioned, these limitations are much more
exclusive in the case of securities than in the case of commodities. But
even after the buyer has negotiated the slippery rungs of this ladder,
he is yet unable to reach the seller unless the ladder is placed on the
foundation that the seller misrepresented a material fact upon the truth
of which the buyer relied. What is fact as distinguished from opinion,
what is material as distinguished from trivial, what is reliance as dis-
tinguished from indifference, are questions which are raised also in con-
nection with other remedies and will be discussed below. The answers
lie largely in individual choice or judgment. The foundation may thus
be difficult or easy to find. In the case of securities it has not been
more easy than difficult.
There remain the tort actions of deceit and negligence. Much has
been written about these actions and the basis of liability for misrepre-
sentation.17  The older action of deceit, true to its name, was a remedy
for villainy. Hornbook has it that the "elements" of the action are that
the defendant made a representation of fact which was false, that the
defendant knew of the falsity but nevertheless made the statement for
the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to rely thereon, that the plaintiff did
rely thereon and suffered damage as a consequence.' Literally, the
charge is a very serious one. It is, in effect, an accusation of thievery,
of procuring money under false pretenses. When gentlemen respected
in the business community were sued in deceit for a false statement in a
prospectus,:' the House of Lords balked at the idea of convicting them
of so serious a charge. The remedy appropriate against deceitful rogues
was not to be applied to respectable business men who believed their
statements to be true, however unreasonably that belief was founded.
The charge against the defendants was couched in terms appropriate for
a criminal prosecution. Deceit might be a crime. The limitations of the
criminal law for the protection of the accused could be borrowed, there-
fore, almost unconsciously, for the protection of the defendants in the tort
(1st Dep't 1918); Corporation Funding & Finance Co. v. Stoffregen, 264 Pa. 215, 107 Ati.
727 (1919); Biel v. Union Fuel & Ice Co., 105 Wash. 41, 177 Pac. 813 (1919). What is
said in notes 11 and 15, supra, is, of course, also applicable here.
17. It would be complete supererogation to attempt exhaustive citation of cases for
what follows. The cases have several times been collected in the numerous discussions of the
problem. See Smith, Liability for Negligent Language (1900) 14 HAsv. L. REv. 184; Williston,
Liability for Honest Misrepresentation (1911) 24 HAsy. L. REV. 415; Bohlen, Misrepresen-
tation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 42 HARV. L. REV. 733; Green, Deceit
(1930) 16 VA. L. Rav. 749 [reprinted in GRaxs, jUDra A=n JTv~ (1930) 280]; Carpenter,
Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation (1930) 24 ILL. L.
Rv. 749; Weisiger, Basis of Liability for Misrepresentation (1930) 24 IrL. L. REv. 866;
Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be Treated As Negligence Or Fraud? (1932) 18
VA. L. REv. 703; Note (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 858.
18. See HaARPER, TORTs (1933) §§ 76, 221, 222; Green, supra note 17.
19. Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
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action.2°  But the decision went beyond the mere form of remedy. The
objection was not directed simply to the uncouth company in which the
defendants would be placed if the deceit action against them were suc-
cessful. As it soon became apparent, the decision was a ruling on the
substantive question of liability, whatever the form of remedy; there was
no redress for pecuniary loss suffered as a result of a misrepresentation
honestly, though negligently, made.2' Judgment on the substantive ques-
tion was happily made easier, however, by the plaintiff's allegation of his
plaint in a form moulded for the dishonest rogue.
The "element" of knowledge by the defendant of the falsity of his
statement was subjected to considerable variation. A number of sub-
stitutes were developed, particularly in the American cases and in Derry
v. Peek22 itself. The requirement of scienter is satisfied, it is variously
said, if (1) the defendant knew of the falsity of the statement, or (2)
did not believe in its truth, or (3) made it recklessly, careless whether
it be true or false, or (4) the defendant made the statement as of knowl-
edge when he knew he had no knowledge of its truth, regardless of his
belief, provided that the statement is of a matter susceptible of knowledge,
or (5) the defendant was in a special position to have knowledge of the
truth of the statement and the plaintiff had no means of knowing, or (6)
the defendant, though innocent of falsehood, had not made a reasonable
investigation and had no reasonable grounds for the belief in the truth of
his statement.3 The latter formula thus disposes of the element of
scienter and substitutes negligence. An unintended honest lie is, then, in
some cases held sufficient to ground an action in deceit which is also the
remedy for the palpable, deliberate fraud. Other cases have preserved
the integrity of the deceit doctrine and have recognized the negligence
action as the appropriate remedy for redress of losses suffered as a
20. Thus Lord Halsbury: "Nevertheless, if, as I have said, the facts are reconcilable
with the innocence of the directors, and with the absence of the mens rea which I con-
sider an essential condition of an action for deceit, the mere fact of the inaccuracy of the
statement ought not to be pressed into constituting a liability which appears to me not to
exist according to the law of England." Id. at 344. Thus, too, Lord Bramwell: "I am
glad to come to this conclusion; for, as far as my judgment goes, it exonerates five
men of good character and conduct from a charge of fraud, which, with all submission, I
think wholly unfounded, a charge supported on such materials as to make all character
precarious." Id. at 345. And Lord Herschell: "The prospectus was therefore inaccurate.
But that is not the question . . . I cannot hold it proved as to any one of them
[defendants] that he knowingly made a false statement, or one which he did not believe
to be true . . . In short, I think they honestly believed that what they asserted was true,
and I am of opinion that the charge of fraud made against them has not been established."'
Id. at 379.
21. LeLievre and Dennes v. Gould, [1393] 1 Q. B. 491. See Note (1931) 31 CoL. L.
Rav. 858, 860, n. 7.
22. Supra note 19.
23. See Green, supra note 17.
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result of honest lying, if remedy is available at all.2" The variation in the
definition of the scienter requirement, particularly in admitting negligence
as a sufficient substitute, has been denounced as confusing and mislead-
ing. False analogy is made plausible, proper decision in accordance with
underlying policy rendered difficult, and the application of incorrect or
inappropriate rules and defenses made apt, it is said, if clear discrim-
ination is not drawn between liability for intended wrongs, liability for
wrongs of negligence and absolute liability unconnected with fault or
wrongdoing. On this analysis, it is urged, deceit should properly .be
confined to cases of intentional lying, negligence to cases of unintended
misrepresentation and warranty to cases where absolute liability is im-
posedY On the other hand, this "confusion" in definition of the scienter
requirement in deceit has been applauded for the flexibility which it per-
mits in reaching and articulating judgment on the basis of the circum-
stances in particular cases. The vagueness and variety is commended pre-
cisely because exercise of judgment on specific circumstances is not
hampered by dogma or concept. 20  This conflict of views relates not to
the substantive questions of liability, not to the question of where the
loss shall be put, but to the method by which the problem is to be posed
for consideration, to the channels in which thought is to be directed. But
while the controversy provides basis for much argument, it is not of great
import here. If the action of deceit is limited to redress for false state-
ments knowingly made (whether or not we assume that defendant's
knowledge is generally susceptible of proof) and no remedy is provided
for loss suffered as a result of honest misrepresentation, the investor's
chances of recovery are seriously curtailed. But even where remedy is
provided for honest misrepresentation, whether by enlargement of the
deceit formula or by way of a negligence action, it is still apparent that
liability in any particular case is entirely dependent upon the variable
judgments of men-trial judge, jurors and appellate judges. Even when
the language of the law, in such cases, is definite and peremptory, the
reality of decision is unknown until these men have announced their
choice. And in the past, this choice has not been very severe on those
whose statements in prospectuses proved to be false.
Whatever instruction is provided by the law on the element of scienter,
determination of other issues is required before the question of liability
is to be answered. It must be determined, the law teaches, whether the
representation was one of fact or merely of opinion, and if of fact, whether
it was of a material fact, and, if of a material fact, whether the plaintiff
24. Compare Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 225 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441
(1931), with Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922); and see International
Products Co. v. Erie Rr. Co., 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 662 (1927).
25. Bohlen, supra note 17; HARPER, op. cit. supra note 18. Cf. Williston, supra note 17.
26. Green, supra note 17.
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did indeed rely upon the representation. For, if the plaintiff actually did
not rely upon the representation, 7 or, even though he did rely upon
it, if the representation did not relate to anything which was a material
factor in the purchase,"8 or, even given both materiality and reliance, if
the representation related not to a matter of fact but to one of opinion,"0
inexorable law requires judgment for the defendant, whether he be an
honest or a dishonest liar. The reasons advanced seem eminently reason-
able. If the plaintiff did not rely upon the defendant's statement, or if
the statement was about an immaterial fact, the plaintiff did not suffer
because of the misrepresentation. For his lie the defendant's soul may
have to suffer; but since he did not cause pecuniary loss, his pocketbook is
immune. Likewise with respect to the issue of fact or opinion. Sellers
are expected to be enthusiastic about their wares and to have exaggerated
opinions about them, particularly in the course of a sale. Buyers, that
is, reasonable buyers, know this and put no stock in sellers' talk and sell-
ers' opinions. If a buyer relies on an opinion expressed by a seller, he is
a fool and has his own folly, not the seller's deceitfulness, to blame for
his loss. 0 Reasonable men may differ as to what is a statement of
fact and what of opinion. But the law is clear.
The law is clear, but it is not always fact. Statements as to legal mat-
ters, it has been held, are statements of opinion, since no one knows
with certainty what decision will be made by a court before the court
makes it. If this is too realistic and it is insisted that law must be fact
because everyone is presumed to know the law, then the buyer knows it
as well as the seller and therefore knows when the seller is misrepresent-
ing it and when the representation should not be believed.31 At any
27. See, e. g., Parnes v. Gnome Manufacturing Co., 93 N. J. Eq. 470, 117 Atl. 148 (1922);
Walker v. Mobile & Ohio Rr. Co., 34 Miss. 245 (1857); Green, supra note 17; and the cases
cited in note 28, infra.
28. See, e. g., National Leather Co. v. Roberts, 221 Fed. 922 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915); Ameri-
can Building & Loan Association v. Bear, 48 Neb. 455, 67 N. W. 500 (1896).
29. See cases cited in notes 31-43, infra.
30. See Holmes, J., in Deming v. Darling, 148 Mass. 504, 505, 20 N. E. 107, 103 (1889):
"The language of some cases certainly seems to suggest that bad faith might make a seller
liable for what are known as 'seller's statements,' apart from any other conduct by which
the buyer is fraudulently induced to forbear inquiries . . . But this is a mistake. It is
settled that the law does not exact good faith from a seller in those vague com-
mendations of his wares which manifestly are open to difference of opinion,--which do not
imply untrue assertions concerning matters of direct observations, . . . and as to which
'it has always been understood, the world over, that such statements are to be distrusted'
." And see Bragg v. Kirksville Farmers Packing & Warehouse Co., 205 Mo. App.
600, 608, 226 S. W. 1012, 1015 (1920): ". . . men, as far back as we know anything of
them, have ever understood that it was unsafe to trust to the opinion of the seller as to
the worth and virtue of his own property. And nothing is more commonly understood
thin that a vendee ordinarily does not and should not rely on the statements of his
vendor when he makes a statement of the value of his property."
31. See notes 32-34, infra; and Note (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 1018, in which the cases
are collected and well analyzed.
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rate statements to the effect that certain stock is non-assessable, 32 or that,
under its charter and applicable law, the corporation is empowered to do
certain things,33 have been held by some courts to be not actionable be-
cause they were opinions on legal problems. In other cases, however,
false statements on legal matters were held actionable if the other ele-
ments of a cause of action were made out.34  Statements as to value are
the preeminent illustrations of non-actionable representations of opin-
ion,3" although here, too, it has been held that, under some circumstances,
thd statements were more of fact and less of opinion and consequently ac-
tionable.36 Non-actionable also are forecasts or statements as to future
conduct. Since they look to the future they are not representations of
fact. Non-actionable, therefore, were held statements to the effect that
certain dividends would be earned or paid; 37 that the stock would be
worth a stated amount in a given time;38 that the proceeds of the issue
would be applied to particular objects; 39 that a stated amount of assets
would be maintained for the benefit of the preferred stockholders;40 and
similar statements as to future events.41 In other cases the courts were
apparently able to delve into the defendant's state of mind at the time he
made the representation and found that it did not include an intention to
live up to the representations at the appointed time, or that it did not en-
tertain an opinion of the kind expressed. They regarded the statements,
then, not as forecasts, promises or opinions, but as misrepresentations of
32. Rogan v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 93 Ill. App. 39 (1901). Cf. Browne v.
San Gabriel River Rock Co., 22 Cal. App. 682, 136 Pac. 542 (1913); Cooper v. Empire Se-
curity Co., 227 Ill. App. 161 (1922); Van Slochem v. Villard, 207 N. Y. 587, 101 N. E.
467 (1913).
33. Russel v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 94 Ga. 510, 20 S. E. 350 (1894).
34. Merchants Realty & Investment Co. v. Kelso, 46 Cal. App. 218, 189 Pac. 116 (1920);
and see Note (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 1018.
35. See note 30, supra; Matthews v. Hogueland, 98 Kan. 342, 157 Pac. 1179 (1916);
and cases collected in Note (1931) 71 A. L. R. 622.
36. Antognini v. Grandi Co., 89 Cal. App. 628, 265 Pac. 378 (1928); Fourth National
Bank v. Webb, 131 Kan. 167, 290 Pac. 1 (1930); McDonald v. Lastinger, 214 S. W. 829
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Note (1927) 13 CoRx. L. Q. 140.
37. Zeh v. Alameda Community Hotel Corp., 122 Cal. App. 366, 10 P. (2d) 190 (1932);
Farmers' Loan & Mortgage Co. v. Langley, 166 La. 251, 117 So. 137 (1928) ; Stalnaker v.
Jones, 68 W. Va. 176, 69 S. E. 651 (1910).
38. Huffstetler v. Our Home Life Insurance Co., 67 Fla. 324, 65 So. 1 (1914); Kimmel
v. Eastern Coal & Mining Co., 97 W. Va. 154, 124 S. E. 661 (1924). Cf. Cuckovich v.
Buckovitch, 82 Mont. 1, 264 Pac. 930 (1928).
39. City National Bank v. Mason, 192 Iowa 1048, 186 N. W. 30 (1922); Field v. Seubert
Bearing Co., 179 App. Div. 780, 167 N. Y. Supp. 294 (1st Dep't 1917); Milwaukee Brick
& Cement Co. v. Schoknecht, 108 Wis. 457, 84 N. W. 838 (1901).
40. Mandelbaum v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 6 F. (2d) 818 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
41. Farwell v. Colonial Trust Co., 147 Fed. 480 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906); Chambers v.
Mitchell, 123 Ill. App. 595 (1905); Lowry National Bank v. Hazard, 223 Pa. 520, 72 AtI.
889 (1909).
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the defendant's present intention, of his present state of mind-a fact42
Or they found the prediction so related to existing or past facts that it was
to be interpreted as a representation of fact.43
If it now seems difficult to make the simple differentiation between
fact and opinion, it is frequently quite as difficult to make the still
simpler determination whether the statement of fact is true or false. Is it
false when, though literally true, it conveys a different impression to the
reasonable reader; when it is true so far as it goes but is misleading
because it omits mention of pertinent qualifications, because it i a
half-truth; when it is ambiguous, false when taken in one sense, true when
taken in another?44
Probably few of the initiate believe that a jury or even a court covers
all this territory painstakingly in every case. But here is an arsenal of
defensive doctrines available to defendants and courts. The plaintiff's
entire offensive is vulnerable to any one of the doctrines. And any one
of them, as has been seen, may be chosen to support a personal, human
judgment. Regardless of the clarity of the instructional law, that judg-
ment, on issues relating so largely to mental state and psychological effect
and so little susceptible of indisputable proof, can be thrown either way.
The results may be harsh or favorable to plaintiffs or defendants. In
the past, they have not been unduly favorable to the plaintiffs. Most of
the litigation has involved comparatively petty security issues and sales.
And those engaged in the business of issuing securities have not failed to
gird themselves for the use of any of the weapons available in this ar-
senal. Circulars and prospectuses are carefully prepared. In so far
as possible, the statements are commonly made on the authority of
others and in terms of opinion, belief or'prediction, with the warning for
good measure that "The statements contained in this circular, while not
guaranteed, are obtained from sources which we believe to be reliable.14
But underlying the above discussion, as a foundation without which
no part of the superstructure can be raised, is the legal issue of the reach
of the defendant's duty. Both in negligence and in deceit, the issue as to
whether or not the defendant owed any duty to the particular plaintiff
42. Electric Hammer Corp. v. Deddens, 206 Ky. 232, 267 S. W. 207 (1924); Faust
v. Parker, 204 Iowa 297, 213 N. W. 794 (1927); Farmers' Co-Operative Grain Co. v. Startzer,
112 Neb. 19, 198 N. W. 170 (1924).
43. See Green, supra note 17.
44. See Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co., 126 Misc. 845, 214 N. Y. Supp. 452 (Mun. Ct.
1926), aff'd, 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (1928); MacIntyre, Criminal Provisions of the
Securities Act and Analogies to Similar Criminal Statutes (1933) 43 YALE 254; Note
(1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1078.
45. As to the effectiveness of such clauses, see Krause v. Cook, 144 Mich. 365, 108 N. W.
81 (1906) ; Duryea v. Zimmerman, 121 App. Div. 560, 106 N. Y. Supp. 237 (2d Dep't 1907) ;
Churchill v. St. George Development Co., 174 App. Div. 1, 160 N. Y. Supp. 357 (4th
Dep't 1916); Continental Insurance Co. v. Equitable Trust Co., 127 Misc. 45, 215 N. Y.
Supp. 281 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Note (1927) 75 U. or PA. L. REV. 660.
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with respect to the representations is primary. And just as in the
cases of warranty or rescission, that issue has insulated a large class of
persons involved on the seller's side in the sale of securities against mis-
representation suits by a large class of investors. Lack of privity,
here as in warranty or rescission, is the verbal insulating matter. The
deceit action is maintainable, we are told, only by one to whom, or to
influence whom, the representation is made. A purchaser of securities
on the exchange, who had not read the prospectus, may not sue in deceit
for a false statement therein because it was not an inducing factor in
his purchase, even though it was a factor in the market valuation at
which be bought. He may not maintain the action even if he had read
and was influenced by the prospectus, because, it is said, the prospectus
is addressed only to the inifial buyers of the security and not to remote
buyers in whose purchases the prospectus issuer has no interest.4 6 The
ambit of duty could, of course, be extended, particularly in the negli-
gence action where foreseeability of harm is a traditional measure. But,
in securities cases, it has not been so extended.
Even as to the initial purchasers, similar restrictions limit the num-
ber of persons involved in the prospectus who may be subjected to liability
if the burden of proof outlined above is sustained. The first limitation is,
again, the notion of privity. Experts, accountants, lawyers, engineers,
appraisers, whose reports are quoted in prospectus or circular, are
deemed not subject to liability even to initial purchasers, unless willful
misconduct is proved.47 They are, it is said, only employees, in effect,
engaged to perform specific tasks. They receive compensation for their
services, not for the assumption of risks of liability in indeterminate
amounts to unknown persons who might suffer unintended loss because
of some neglect in the performance of those tasks. Their duty to render
46. Cheney v. Dickinson, 172 Fed. 109 (C. C. A. 7th, 1909); Hunnewell v. Duxbury,
154 Mass. 286, 28 N. E. 267 (1891); Dinsmore v. National Hardwood Co., 234 Mich. 436,
208 N. W. 701 (1926) ; Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N. Y. 454, 20 N. E. 376 (1889) ; Greene
v. The Mercantile Trust Co., 60 Misc. 189, 111 N. Y. Supp. 802 (Sup. Ct. 1908); Nicol's
Case, 3 De G. & 3. 387, 438 (1859); Peek v. Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 377 (1873). But cf.
Gern6r v. Mosher, 58 Neb. 135, 78 N. W. 384 (1899); Houston v. Thornton, 122 N. C.
365, 29 S. E. 827 (1898); and see Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation (1931) 31
COL. L. R v. 264.
47. There seems to be no case in which a purchaser of securities has brought suit against
such an expert for false statements in his reports quoted in a prospectus. But there have
been many cases in which credit was extended, property bought or other action taken
by plaintiffs in reliance upon similar reports made to third persons. The recent case
of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., supra note 24 (suit against firm of accountants
which prepared a balance sheet on the faith of which the plaintiff advanced credit), at-
tracted wide attention. Chief judge Cardozo's opinion for the court makes a thorough and
exhaustive analysis of precedent. Cases dealing with other experts are collected in the
many comments on the Touche, Niven case. See Note (1930) 30 CoL.'L. REv. 1066; Note




careful service and commit no negligence arises out of the contract by
which they are employed and is owed to their employers. To others
they owe only the duty not to make knowingly false statements. The
risks of loss to persons other than their employers, attendant upon er-
rors unknowingly committed by such experts, is to be shifted, if at all,
to the business which the experts are employed to serve and which de-
rives the profits from the enterprise to which their service is incidental.
Sufficient deterrence against negligence in the performance of their ser-
vices is provided by the threat of liability to their employers, by hope of
further employment, and by desire for professional standing. Unlimited
liability to persons beyond the contract, if reason therefor exists, must
be imposed by the legislatures, not the courts. So runs the argument.
A related, and similarly justified, principle bf limitation is that liability
should be imposed for the consequences of one's own misconduct, not vi-
cariously for the misconduct of others. Denial of recovery to a plaintiff
may, then, be rested upon a finding that the defendant did not personally
participate in the misrepresentation. The defendant may have been an
inactive director in the company which issued the statement. He may
have lent his name simply to adorn the board without undertaking or
being asked to undertake any duties of supervision. Or he may have
become a director for the purpose of advising on limited, specific phases
of the company's business. Or he may have suited his own whim or
convenience in his attention to company matters, attending to some and
ignoring others. If, for whatever reason, the director took no part in the
preparation, ratification or issuance of the false statement or circular, he
is not liable, it has been held, to purchasers who acted on the faith of
the statement.4 8  He has done nothing. And he is not to be held
vicariously for the fraud or negligence of others, co-directors, execu-
tives or underwriters, unless he has constituted them his "agents. 4 0  It
may be urged, as it has been held in other connections, 0 that the director
is not sought to be held liable vicariously for another's tort, but directly
for his own neglect properly to perform the duties of his office; that by
consenting to be named a director he comes under certain affirmative ob-
ligations imposed by law which he must discharge at the pain of liability
for his neglect; that the liability imposed is for his own disregard of
48. Gerner v. Mosher, supra note 46; Rives v. Bartlett, 215 N. Y. 33, 109 N. E. 83
(1915); Arthur v. Griswold, 55 N. Y. 400 (1874); Ottman v. Blaugas Co. of Cuba, 171
App. Div. 197, 157 N. Y. Supp. 413 (1st Dep't 1916); McFarland v. Carlsbad Sanitarium
Co., 68 Ore. 530, 137 Pac. 209 (1913); Sugarland Industries v. Parker, 293 S. W. 609
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
49. See Downey v. Finucane, 205 N. Y. 251, 98 N. E. 391 (1912)), as explained in
Rives v. Bartlett, supra note 48.
50. Cf. Chapple v. Jacobsen, 234 Mich. 558, 208 N. W. 754 (1926); Solomon v. Bates,




the duties inseparably attached to his office. But while there has been
much preaching about the fiduciary character of the director's office, the
great trust and confidence invested in it by shareholders and others, and
the sacred duty resting upon directors not to betray their trust and to
discharge their duties well, non-participation in the issuance of a pros-
pectus or circular has been for directors a quite invulnerable armor
against civil liability. And, in general, suits against directors are still
among the most difficult to win.
The common law with respect to liability for misrepresentation in
the sale of securities has now been set down." In verbal statement at
least, the liability is, for some cases, very severe. As between vendor
and purchaser, rescission is generally available for a false statement
of material fact without regard to the bona fides, honest belief, or
reasonableness of the belief, of the vendor. Where rescission is not ap-
propriate and damages are sought, liability is imposed not absolutely, but
for fault. Fault is, however, a technical, legal trademark-a symbol
which denotes source, not composition. Even under the most limited
doctrine of liability for false statement, that requiring actual fraud-
scienter-the innocent, honest utterer is subject to the risk of liability.
For, innocence and honesty must be established long after the event in
a court which has no exact means of ascertaining states of mind, memory
or conscience, and to the satisfaction of men who are to judge on the
51. Mention should be made of three legislative attempts to protect investors. The
Blue Sky Laws which have been enacted in almost all the states are discussed elsewhere in
this issue. McIntyre, supra note 44. These laws do not enlarge upon the common-law
liability for false statement. Typically, they require the licensing of brokers and registra-
tion of proposed security issues. Violation of the laws by sales without license or registration
renders the sales voidable and there are many instances, in the reports, of the rescission of
sales for such violations. Some of the acts permit an action against the directors and officers
of the seller who "knowingly" participated in such a sale. But the acts make no provision
for civil action by purchasers for misrepresentation in the registration statements. And it
has been held that purchasers who bought on the strength of statements filed with a
commission pursuant to such laws may not recover for misrepresentation except on the
usual common-law grounds; even more, that such statements are not directed to pur-
chasers and that, consequently, purchasers have "no right to rely" on them. See, e. g.,
Dinsmore v. National Hardwood Co., supra note 46. Moreover, large classes of securities,
such as those listed on recognized exchanges, are exempted from the requirements of these
laws.
The Post Office Department has authority, by fraud or stop orders, to close the mails to
fradulent security-selling schemes. But, obviously, only flagrant frauds are affected by
this power.
Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Federal Trade Commission has
power to enter cease and desist orders in crtain cases of unfair competition. The power
has occasionally been exercised to stop false advertising of securities. But clearly the in-
vestor has secured little protection from this source. Securities, unlike patent medicines,
are not continuously advertised. An entire issue could be sold several times before the
Commission could make an investigation and enter its order.
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basis of conflicting evidence and who are entitled not to believe testimony
given under the most solemn oath or affirmation. Knowledge, intention
and fraud are thus provable by circumstances. And circumstances may
damn where conscience is pure. But knowledge of falsity is not re-
quired even under the most limited doctrine. It is sufficient if the state-
ment of fact was made as of knowledge when there was no knowledge
(of its. truth), or that it was made recklessly, careless whether it be
true or false, or that it was made without belief in its truth. And lack of
investigation by the defendant, carelessness in investigation, or absence
of reasonable grounds for the professed belief, are circumstances from
which the requisite scienter may be inferred. Finally, in some cases,
whether by redefinition of the scienter requirement in the deceit action
or by direct extension of the negligence action, a cause of action has been
permitted for false statements honestly but negligently made. In the
ideal of the law, then, issuers and sellers of securities have lived under very
great risks of liability, at least to their immediate vendees. But they
have lived well because the reality was not so harsh. Reality was
sporting: very few investors brought suit. Reality was indulgent: the
men empowered to decide cases made many allowances for the practices
of the time. And reality recognized that the ideal required only truth in
statement made, not that full statement be made; that sales could be
promoted with only scant statement; that troublesome questions could
be avoided by omitting mention of a variety of matters and confining
circular and prospectus to truthful description of the show window
without taking the investor through the store behind it.
Now comes the Securities Act. It requires a picture not simply of
the show window, but of the entire store. It requires not simply truth
in the statements volunteered, but disclosure. And, for false state-
ment, it provides civil liability. To what extent the lethargy of in-
vestors or the indulgence of courts will be affected is unknown. But the
ideal of the liability under the Act may be compared with that at common
law.
II
The civil liability provisions of the Act are found in Sections 11 and 12.
The latter section is the lesser of the two and has not evoked much
criticism. It provides that (1) "any person" who sells a security as to
which a registration statement is not in effect, or who sells a security by
the use of a prospectus which does not meet the requirements of Section
10, shall be liable "to the person purchasing such security from him, who
may sue . . . to recover the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the se-
curity"; and (2) that the same liability shall be visited upon any person
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who sells a security "by means of a prospectus or oral communication,
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading," if
the purchaser does not know of the untruth or omission and the seller
does not "sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or
omission."
Neither part of the section puts the seller under a novel, indeterminate
or harsh risk. The liability is imposed in favor of the immediate vendee
only. Once it is determined that registration and prospectus are neces-
sary, it cannot be unduly difficult to ascertain whether a registration
statement is in effect and what prospectus satisfies the requirements of
Section 10. The effective date of the registration is defined in Section
8; and the contents of the prospectus, as required in Section 10, are
specific portions of the registration statement or such information as the
Commission may specifically order. The first part of Section 12 does not
deal with the truth or falsity of the representations in the registration
statement or prospectus. It puts upon the seller only the burden of
ascertaining the existence of a registration statement and the conformity
of the prospectus with that statement. The absolute liability thus im-
posed for the sale of unregistered securities or for the use of non-
conforming prospectuses is merely that commonly imposed by state
Blue Sky laws for similar violations.
The liability imposed by the second part of Section 12 is less stringent.
The seller may avoid it by sustaining the burden of proof that he was
excusably ignorant of the untruth or omission in the prospectus. In per-
mitting such a defense to rescission, the Act seems also to be less string-
ent than the commn law. Common-law doctrine, as generally enun-
ciated, allows the buyer to rescind upon proof merely that the seller made
a false statement of fact material to the sale. The seller's ignorance
of the falsehood, whether excusable or not, is no defense. This is certain-
ly true with respect to statements made by the seller himself. It is
doubtless also true in cases where the seller adopts the prospectus and
sends it to talk for him. Query whether it is true where the seller
sends the prospectus with the warning: "I take no responsibility for
anything stated in the prospectus. It contains pertinent information;
but I have no knowledge as to the matters stated therein and make no
representations about them." Even if the common-law remedy of re-
scission does not extend to such a case, its inclusion in Section 12-if it
is included to the extent of requiring the seller to prove that in the exer-
cise of reasonable care he could not have acquired such knowledge-is
not a revolutionary innovation. On the contrary it is in accord with the
tendency in sales generally to put upon the seller the risk of loss from
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false statements in the course of a sale, at least to the point of permitting
the buyer to rescind.
The common-law remedy of rescission is limited, however, to cases
where restoration of the status quo is effected, where the buyer re-
turns what he received from the seller; whereas Section 12 permits the
buyer who has disposed of the security to sue for damages. The amount
recoverable is quite obviously the difference between the consideration
paid and the amount at which the buyer disposed of the security, less any
income received thereon by the buyer,-so that the result is substantially
that reached where the buyer returns the security to the seller. 2 This
is innovation, if you like. But the severest critic of the Securities Act
could hardly condemn this change if it were effected by independent
legislation reforming procedure. For, explanation of the difference in
the common law between the buyer's action for rescission and his action
for damages must be sought not in logic or principle, but in history. And
the historical basis of the difference is procedure. At law the seller's
false statement, originally even his fraud, was nb defense in an action
against the buyer for breach of contract. And the only legal remedy
available to the buyer was the action for deceit or breach of warranty.
Rescission was available only in equity. It was employed principally
where the contract was still executory. The purpose was not merely to
secure restoration but to cancel the plaintiff's obligation and enjoin the de-
fendant from suing on it at law. If, in the absence of fraud or breach
of a fiduciary relationship, the buyer was seeking simply a money decree,
the equity court, it was said, lacked jurisdiction to grant him relief. It
was want of equity jurisdiction, not want of equity, which defeated the
buyer. Thus, the buyer's substantive right depended upon the court
in which the right was sought to be, and could be, enforced. Under
modern practice where separate courts of law and equity do not exist
and all appropriate relief is available in one court, there seems to be
52. It may be suggested that the section does not in express terms provide for this
measure of damages and that it permits an interpretation whereby damages may be awarded
in accord with whatever measure is employed at common law. The United States Supreme
Court has approved the so-called tort measure, namely, the difference between the amount
paid and the market value at the time of delivery to the buyer. Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S.
125 (1889).
But on a fair reading the section seems hardly susceptible of such an interpretation.
The section attempts to place the investor who sold his security in no less favorable posi-
tion than the one who retained it. See Legis. (1933) 33 CoL. L. Rtv. 1220, 1228, 1233.
Particularly in the case of securities it would seem nonsensical to discriminate for the
purposes of Section 12 (2) between the investor who retained his securities and the one
who sold them. For, the latter could generally repurchase in the market and destroy the
discrimination. The theory of the section is rescission. And the definition of the measure
of damages seems to be meant for any suit brought uder it, so that, mutatis mutandis, the




no reasonable basis for differentiating between the buyer who is in a
position to return the subject of the sale to the seller and the buyer who
has disposed of it, beyond so framing the judgment that the net result
achieved for the one will be the same as that achieved for the other.
The further differentiation in the earlier day was an incident of a differ-
ent court organization and a different procedure. The crystallization
of that incident at the present day into a rule of substantive law is
justifiable only if it is consonant with the considerations of policy which
determine the substantive question of liability. Consonance there is,
if it is deemed desirable that, as between buyer and seller, the risks in-
cident to false statement inducing the purchase should fall upon the
buyer. For, then, the differentiation does limit the seller's liability, even
though by a haphazard chance method dependent upon irrelevant con-
siderations. If, however, it is deemed desirable to shift the risk to the
seller, then the differentiation results in unjustifiable dissonance between
the policy and its administration. For, then, the risk is not shifted and
the policy is contravened simply because of an irrelevant chance phen-
omenon.
It is easy to clothe the phenomenon in a cloak of pertinence which
hides its lack of significance. It has been said that when restoration
of the status quo is had, no affirmative burden is placed on the defendant,
no money is taken from his pocket. He simply loses the advantage
of his bargain with the plaintiff. Of this loss he is not to complain, since
the false statement was, after all, made by him and since, concededly,
both parties acted under mutual mistake of the truth. There is no un-
fairness, therefore, in simply calling bets off. But where the buyer has
disposed of the article and is asking damages, he is seeking to impose an
affirmative obligation on the defendant,--not simply to call bets off and
restore the status quo, but to take money out of the defendant's pocket.
Illustration with the sale of a horse seems to prove the unfairness of per-
mitting the buyer to win in such a case. If the plaintiff, who bought
the horse from the defendant for $100 and sold it for $50, were permitted
to recover $50 from the defendant, the latter would be minus the horse
and plus $50. In effect, he would have sold his horse for $50. But non
constat that, even with knowledge and disclosure of the truth, the de-
fendant would not have valued the horse for his own use at more than
$50 or would not have been able to sell it himself at more than $50. And
the case is not altered by taking, instead of the plaintiff's sale price, a
so-called market price; for in the horse case that is a fiction or, at best,
a norm of variant prices.
As applied to securities, at least when listed on exchanges, this argu-
ment is a cloak of cellophane. No sentimental value attaches to any
specific shares. All the shares of an issue are alike. They are readily
obtainable in the market. The price at any specific time is reasonably
fixed. Whether the plaintiff or the defendant makes the sale at a par-
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ticular time, the price will probably be the same. Whenever the defend-
ant wants the shares to hold for a price rise or investment, he can pur-
chase them in the market. It can make little difference to him whether
the plaintiff returns the security, then selling for $50, and asks for the
$100 he paid, or sells the security in the market for $50 and asks for the
$50 difference between the sale and purchase price. In either case, the
defendant parts with $50. If it is fair to impose liability in the
first case, it is equally fair to do so in the second.
Other considerations make this similarity of treatment desirable. As
stated earlier, the falsity of a statement respecting securities is generally
not so easily discoverable as one respecting commodities. The buyer
of securities confronted with a fall in price may not have the means, or
may deem it unwise, to carry them longer. He may sell for the purpose
of mitigating his loss without knowing of the falsity of the statement
made to him. If it is good policy to shift unto the seller the risk of loss
resulting from false statements used by him to effect the sale, then this
buyer needs to be relieved of the loss fully as much as the buyer whose
means were more ample or whose judgment was different. Possible com-
plaint by the seller that the buyer sold too soon is hardly appealing. It is
of no greater weight than the complaint, where the buyer has not sold,
that he held on too long. It can be assumed that if the seller wished to
speculate in the security, he could have done so, regardless of the buyer's
conduct. Add the provision immunizing the seller if "he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known" of the un-
truth or omission, and one is impressed by the leniency rather than the
stringency of the liability imposed as compared with that under the
common-law doctrine.5"
The section is silent as to possible time limits on the buyer's conduct
after discovery of the false statement. In equity suits for rescission
apart from the Act, the defense of laches may be interposed where it
is claimed that the buyer did not act with reasonable diligence after dis-
covery of the defect. Section 13 provides that legal action must be
brought within two years after such discovery or "after such discovery
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence." 4  If the
buyer discovers the untruth one-half year after his purchase, may he
53. The provision evidences the purpose of the Act not to mollycoddle the investor, but
to impose upon sellers of securities an affirmative obligation to disclose that which by the
exercise of reasonable care they can ascertain. Of course, the duty is instinct with risk that
their judgment and the judgments of courts and juries as to what constitutes reasonable
care will differ. But that is probably the least of the risks which those who purchase and
sell securities encounter.
54. The section provides further that actions under Sections 11 and 12 (1) may not
be brought "more, than 10 years after the security was bona fide offered to the public."
No maximum limitation is provided for actions under section 12 (2) other than the two-
year period mentioned in the text.
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wait a year or more before tendering the security to the seller or before
selling it himself? Or, indeed, may he sell the security after such dis-
covery or must he choose rescission if he would avail himself of the pro-
tection given by the section? Moreover, is any notice to the seller
necessary, other than the institution of suit for rescission or damages?
What the judicial answers to these question will be is conjectural. A
short answer to all of them is that, there being nothing in the section to
the contrary, the buyer may do what he pleases so long as he brings
suit within the stipulated two-year period. In any event, these are
minute points of detail which litigation will ultimately settle and which
should be mentioned, if at all, with an apology for the pettiness. Of
greater importance is the omission from this section of any requirement
of proof of reliance by the buyer on the untrue statement and of causal
connection between the falsity of the statement and the buyer's loss on
the security. But the same omission is made in Section 11 and con-
sideration of this feature, as well as of the significance of the phrase
"material fact," will be reserved for the discussion of that section.
It is to the liabilities provided for in Section 11 that the paralysis of
security flotation prophesied by some is attributed. That section subjects
to liability, with respect to every part of the registration statement, every
person who signed the registration statement (Section 6 requires that the
statement be signed by the issuer, its principal executive, financial and
accounting officers and a majority of the board of directors); every
person who was a director at the time of filing; every person who is
named in the statement as about to become a director; and every under-
writer. Experts who are named in the statement as having prepared
or certified a part of the statement or a report or valuation which is
used in connection therewith are subjected to liability only with respect
to the part of the statement, report or valuation which purports to have
been prepared or certified by them. The condition of liability is that a
"part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the state-
ments therein not misleading." The right of action is given to "any
person acquiring such security," who, as under Section 12, may sue
"either . . . [1] to recover the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
the tender of such security, or [2] for damages if he no longer owns the
security." But "in no case" may "the amount recoverable under this
section exceed the price at which the security was offered to the public" 55
55. § 11(g). Literally, this is a limitation on the amount of the judgment in any case
and not a measure by which that amount is to be determined. If so interpreted, the pur-
chaser who bought at $150 and sold at $25, the offering price being $100, could recover
$100, not $75. Commissioner Landis has stated that, under his interpretation, the recovery
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The liability of the issuer is almost absolute. The only defense given him
is that the plaintiff, at the time of his acquisition of the security, knew
of the untruth or omission. 6 Every other person who is subject to
liability may avoid it by sustaining the burden of proof that, upon
reasonable investigation he had reasonable ground to believe and did
believe at the time the registration statement became effective, that the
challenged statements were true and that there was no omission of a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading.5T  The standard of reasonableness by
which this defense is to be measured is "that required of a person oc-
cupying a fiduciary relationship.""8
In an accompanying article, the definition of the persons thus sub-
jected to liability is scrutinously discussed.59 Our present concern is with
the grounds and extent of the liability. In several important particulars
the Acts departs from the common-law civil liability. (1) A purchaser
of securities may sue the persons named even though he purchased in the
market after the securities had gone through several hands. (2) He
may sue even though he never read or knew of the untrue or mis-
leading statement prior to his purchase. (3) He need not establish a
causal connection between the untruth and his loss, nor is he barred if
such causal connection be disproved. (4) Scienter and its varia-
tions are definitely supplanted by the notions of insufficient investigation
and unreasonable grounds for belief; and the standard of reasonableness
is, not that of "the ordinary, prudent man under the circumstances," but
that required of a fiduciary. (5) The burden is on the defendant to
establish the reasonableness of his investigation and belief, rather than
on the plaintiff to establish the contrary. (6) A measure of damages dif-
ferent in some respects from that under the common law is provided.6
would be limited to $75. See Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933
(1933) 43 YALE L. J. 171, 175. This interpretation is proper if it is borne in mind that
the theory of the liability is that of rescission and that the Act attempts to place in the
same position both the investor who retained his securities and the investor who sold them.
56. He has, of course, in addition, the defense that the plaintiff has not made out
his case by proving that the statement was false, that it related to fact and that the fact
was material.
57. An expert may also avoid liability by showing that the part of the registration state-
ment involved "was not a fair copy of or extract from his report or valuation as an expert."
"As regards any part of the registration statement purporting to be made on the authority of
an expert (other than himself) or purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report
or valuation of an expert (other than himself)," the defendant may avoid liability by
showing merely that "he had reasonable ground to believe and did believe," and that the
statement "fairly represented" the statement of the expert. The burden of the defense
is similarly lightened with respect to any part of the registration statement "purporting
to be a statement made by an official person or purporting to be a copy of or extract
from a public or official document." See also note 56, supra.
58. § 11(c).
59. Douglas and Bates, supra note 55.
60. It is said that two conflicting measures of damages have been developed at common
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On the other hand, conceptions familiar in the common law are retained.
(1) The untruth must relate to a matter of "fact" as distinguished,
presumably, from one of "opinion." (2) The fact must be a material
one. (3) The burden is on the plaintiff to establish, in addition, that
the statement was untrue or misleading.
The most striking innovation is, of course, that dispensing with any re-
quirement of privity and permitting "any person acquiring" the security
to sue the persons enumerated. To this provision are incident the
second and third features mentioned which dispense with the require-
ment of proof of reliance or causation. 61  For these incidents, there is
ample justification if the desirability of the principal object be assumed.
Administratively, reliance and causation are very troublesome subjects of
inquiry. Whether the plaintiff read or knew of the statement and
whether he relied upon it in making his purchase, are questions rarely,
if ever, subject to exact answer. The plaintiff himself can rarely iden-
tify the individual factors which influenced his judgment. If proof of
reliance is required, he can be trusted in any case, with or without advice
of counsel, to allege and testify that he did rely. The question of reliance
tends to merge with that of materiality and the answer to the latter is
generally also the answer to the former. The plaintiff's assertion that
he relied upon the statement, unless taken on faith, will be believed
if it appears reasonable that such reliance was had. If the statement re-
lates to something triffing or inconsequential, an inference that reliance
was placed upon it seems unreasonable. If it relates to something
law, and jurisdictions have been frequently classified accordingly: (1) the so-called tort
measure, which is the difference between the purchase price and the market value at the
time of delivery; (2) the so-called warranty measure, which is the difference between the
value as represented and the actual (or market) value at the time of delivery. The one,
it is said, makes the plaintiff whole; the other gives him the benefit of his expected bargain.
Nash v. Minnesota Title Insurance & Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574,40 N. E. 1039 (1895) ; McNulty
v. Whitney, 273 Mass. 494, 174 N. E. 121 (1930); Reno v. Bull, 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E.
144 (1919). But these are generalizations which were not developed with reference to se-
curities specificially. And they are only generalizations. "Varying circumstances," said the
New York Court of Appeals, "must logically require variation in the application of that
measure of damages. In Reno v. Bull, supra, we applied that measure of damages in the
case of a sale of corporate stock where there were no extraordinary features. We did not
hold that other cases might not require a different application of the rule." Hotaling v.
A. B. Leach & Co., supra note 44, at 88, 159 N. E. at 871. And, though apparently
wedded under Reno v. Bull to the tort measure, the court allowed recovery measured
neither by the tort nor by the warranty rule, but by the difference between the purchase
price and the price at which the plaintiff sold his security. Under Sections 11 and 12 as
interpreted by Commissioner Landis, this measure alone must be applied. See notes 52
and 55, supia.
61. The English Companies Act, 19 & 20 Gao. V, c. 23, § 37 (1929), provides for
liability in favor of "all persons who subscribe for any shares or debentures on the faith of
the prospectus for the loss or damage they may have sustained by reason of any untrue
statements therein . . Y
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material or important, the inference seems reasonable and supports the
plaintiff's assertion. The inquiries are merged, then, in the question,
Was the statement material? Section 11 puts the plaintiff under the
burden of establishing materiality. If it is desirable to extend the liabil-
ity beyond the parties in privity of contract or sale, there seems to be
little point in requiring proof of reliance in addition to that of material-
ity. Granted that in some cases materlality and reliance can be sep-
arated and that the plaintiff's claim might be defeated for lack of the
latter, the gain in point of judicial administration is probably worth the
loss in prejudice to some defendants. Moreover, requirement of proof
of reliance would not mitigate the liability in any determinate amount.
It would simply provide a talking point in litigation, with the outcome
entirely conjectural. The risks of liability would consequently be sub-
stantially the same. The absence of the requirement, whatever bearing
it may have on the issue of fairness in particular litigations, can hardly
be advanced as ground for the claim that the Act makes the flotation
of securities unduly burdensome.
Even more ample justification exists for the omission of the require-
ment of causal connection between the untruth and the loss. If it be
assumed that the untruth related to a fact, material even at the time
of the issue rather than at the time of plaintiff's purchase, an inquiry
into the causal relation would involve a difficult and inconclusive ex-
cursion into philosophical conceptions and imponderables. It is easy to
assume in argument that the decline in the price of a security was due so
much to economic and other factors unconnected with the untruth and
so much, or not at all, to the untruth itself. But to prove the assumption
by convincing evidence at a trial months or years after the event would
seem well-nigh impossible. Whether the market had or had not dis-
counted the untruth in valuing the security would seem to be a matter
for anyone's guess. Philosophically, it can be said that the untruth is
always a cause of the plaintiff's loss. No one can say with exactitude
what chain of circumstances would have ensued had the untrue state-
ment not been made. In rescission at common law, causation is not a
requirement. It appears in actions for deceit, breach of warranty or
negligence. When applied in cases involving commodities as to which
there is some classification of grades, as, for example, grade A and
grade B milk, or in cases of personal injuries alleged to have been
caused by defective commodities, inquiry into the causal relations be-
tween the misrepresentation of the grade or quality and the loss incurred
by the plaintiff may be pursued with some reason and success. But in
security cases, where each issue is unique, where there can be no classi-
fication of grade in any issue, it would seem to be a hopeless and unreason-
able task to make a similar inquiry. The liability under Section 11 is
modelled after that in rescission. It makes judicial administration com-
paratively easy. Again it may be said that the requirement of proof of
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cause would not mitigate the risk of liability by any determinate amount,
but would simply provide a talking point for litigants. The gain in
administration may itself be worth the attendant prejudice to some de-
fendants. And finally, the causation element is not really entirely
banished. Banished in name it is, but not entirely in effect. To a large
extent it is instinct in the element of materiality.
The principal innovation mentioned cannot be discussed without con-
stant regard for the purpose of the Act to prevent the occasions for im-
position of liability rather than to provide for such liability. That sub-
stantial risks are created cannot be denied. But their magnitude is
easily overemphasized. Abstractly, there is no limit to the liability. If
each share of an issue were to be traded in many times at prices which
fluctuated sharply up and down, and each purchaser of the security who
sustained a loss were to bring suit, no limit would exist other than the
patience, skill and endurance of the most skillful mathematician. But
this is in the world of nightmares. In reality there is no such monster.
If experience is any kind of a teacher, we can confidently expect that
most investors will not bring suit. In the first place, litigation in
America is too expensive. The investor who has sustained a small loss
would only be sending good money after bad, even if victory were
assured. In the second place, while it is easy to assume for discussion
an untrue or misleading statement, discovery and proof of it by the in-
vestor is an entirely different and incomparably more difficult and ex-
pensive task. It is to be remembered that no representative action is pro-
vided nor is any agency established for the bringing of a collective suit.
Each investor must sue separately. Each must become aware of the
untruth and have the means of verifying it. In the third place, the li-
ability is not absolute. In addition to the defenses that the statement re-
ferred to opinion rather than fact, that it was literally true rather than
false, that it was innocently ambiguous rather than actively misleading,
that it was unimportant rather than material-defenses which in common-
law actions afforded broad avenues for escape,-the defendants other
than the issuer may avoid liability by showing that they had a reasonably
grounded belief in the truth of the statement. It has been seen that in
the common-law actions lack of reasonable ground for belief, when not
recognized directly as a basis of liability, was treated as evidence of
scienter, fraud or knowledge of falsity. The risks of liability under
these formulae have not kept the persons named in Section 11, upon
whom these risks rested, from engaging in their occupations and have
not eliminated prosperity from their occupations. Reasonable care is
a plastic concept which has been adapted to specific cases without undue
hardship to defendants. It would be strange, indeed, if, in cases under
the Securities Act, human judgment of reasonableness would become
warped. The Act does place the burden of proof on the defendant and
defines the standard of reasonableness in terms of that required of a
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fiduciary. But the defendants are in the best position to know what
their conduct was and to explain it. And the risks of liability resting
upon fiduciaries have not prevented men from assuming the manage-
ment of large trusts, even though their possible liabilities were out of
all proportion to their actual emoluments. 62 The standard of care re-
quired of a fiduciary is merely a verbal formula. It is quite as plastic
as the formula "reasonable care under the circumstances. ' 'ca In many
phases of corporation law directors are said to be fiduciaries or subject
to liability for failure to exercise reasonable care in their supervision. 4
Yet the director's office has not been regarded as an unduly hazardous
one.
The difference is, of course, that the Act has extended the reach of
duty. It denies the defense available at common law that the defendant
was under no duty to the plaintiff, a person with whom he was not in the
relation of privity of contract, to use any amount of care in his conduct,
other than to refrain from fraudulently deceiving him. Assuming that
the legal difference between fraud and negligence as bases of liability is
reasonably clear-an assumption which, as we have seen, is not justified
by some cases prior to the Act,--the extension of the duty to cover neg-
ligence as well as fraud is in accord with the general "assault upon the
citadel of privity" that judges have been making for some time without
legislation. In the Toucke, Niven case, 6 some of the judges were will-
ing retroactively to subject accountants to a liability similar to that un-
der the Act, without the help of legislation and without previous specific
warning. Had they been sitting on the "courtsof ultimate error," rather
than on those of primary or intermediate error, their opinion would have
prevailed. The decision would probably have been adversely criticized
by some but it would not have been an unusual step in the evolution of
judge-made law.
The severer liability imposed on the issuer is quite analogous to that
imposed upon manufacturers and commodity trademark owners in per-
sonal injury cases, and with some more reason. The commodity manu-
facturer's liability has no relation, and is out of all proportion, to the
62. See, e. g., Doyle v. Chatham & Phoenix National Bank, 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E.
574 (1930).
63. The American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Draft T. No. 2
(1931), defines the standard of care required of a fiduciary thus: "Section 169. The
trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care
and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property;
and if the trustee has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under
a duty to exercise such skill as he has."
64. See McCormick v. King, 241 Fed. 737 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); Chapple v. Jacobson,
234 Mich. 558, 208 N. W. 754 (1926); Hun v. Carey, 82 N. Y. 65 (1880); Berle, For
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees (1932) 45 HAnv. L. REv. 1365.
65. Supra note 24.
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price he received for the specific commodity which caused damage. The
issuer's liability is limited in any case to the price at which the security
was offered to the public, substantially the amount received by him.
With respect to the issuance of securities, a great hazard is imposed on
the institution of inactive or dummy directors, a hazard which, it is
prophesied by some, will abolish that institution at least in the course
of issue. Whether the institution is worth preserving at all or in this
particular, is a question of policy which cannot here be discussed. But
with respect to active directors and principal officers the requirement im-
posed is that only of reasonable diligence in the performance of work
which involves risks of loss to others. The risk of liability is no greater
and perhaps even more justifiable than that imposed upon experts for
untrue or misleading statements in their reports. As suggested elsewhere,
provision can probably be made by private contract for indemnification
of directors and officers by the issuer."" The risks would then be reduced
to those of secondary liability.
III
We can close as we began. The civil liability provisions of the Act
are important; but they are not to be overemphasized at the expense of
the major purposes of the Act. Civil liability is imposed partly for the
purpose* of compensating investors, partly, and probably more, for the
purpose of compelling compliance with the Act so as to avoid certain types
of losses and the need of compensation. Administrative machinery is set
up to facilitate compliance. Certainty about every conceivable detail
cannot be expected-not any more from this Act than from any other
piece of legislation, not any more from the law than from the numerous
other institutions which the security business encounters. There may
be question as to the wisdom of requiring disclosure of certain matters.
There may be ambiguity or obscurity as to the standing or classification
of some persons under the Act, although the standing of those major in
number and importance is beyond even factitious dispute. There may be
doubt as to the wisdom of requiring all directors to take an active pre-
cautionary interest in issue work. There may be concern about the inci-
dence of liability upon certain persons whose position may be such as
not to warrant it. And there may doubtless be need or desire for fur-
ther legislation. Studies directed to such specific matters will aid in the
building of the structure for which the Act lays the foundation. But it is
misleading to focus on the civil lability. Once the policy questions as to
the objectives of the Act are answered, there is little in the civil liability
provsions which, in a less scientific and less systematic manner, could
not or would not have been quietly developed over a period of years by
courts on the basis of their own common-law precedents.
66. Douglas and Bates, supra note 55, at 178.
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